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Environmental Governance of the Arctic:
Law, Effect, Now Implementation
Joseph F.C. DiMento*
J.D., Ph.D., University of California, Irvine
This Article addresses how the international community governs the
Arctic and whether that community, or parts of it, should be governing it
differently. Its core is analysis of programs specifically created to protect and
manage that regional sea. More broadly, this Article presents the great range
of policy and regulatory activity that focuses on the environmental quality of
the region. The aim is not only to describe and evaluate existing governance
structures but also to indicate how governance can be improved. One
approach emphasized, rather than or in addition to working on more
international initiatives, is to focus on implementation of the myriad, almost
paralyzing, existing international legal obligations. Implementation is
addressed in the organizational studies context. Implementation in the legal
sense of executing international law into domestic systems is the starting
point for our focus on implementation. The research is based on a
multidisciplinary literature analysis; field visits; and policymaker, scientific,
and legal expert interviews. I argue that more fully applying knowledge from
implementation studies can improve Arctic environmental governance,
irrespective of decisions made about additional legal obligations.
“[H]e who controls the Arctic controls the world.”1

* Versions of this Article have benefited from the contributions of the participants at the January 2015
Symposium on Arctic Governance at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. I extend
particular thanks to the lead commentators on this Article: Professor Robert Lutz, Dr. Kathryn
Mengerink, and Mr. Brooks Yeager. Dr. Oran Young provided invaluable guidance in the early stages
of the Article’s conceptualization. Christina Tsou and Betty Lim of the UCI Law Library provided
invaluable help in updating the literature on implementation. Lisa Payne of UCI Law assisted in the
production and organization of the original manuscript.
1. Denis Richard Gibbs, MacKinder Meets Buzan: A Geopolitical Extension to Security
Complex Theory with an Emphasis on the Polar Regions 235 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Waikato) (on file with the Central Library, University of Waikato) (quoting R. Douglas
Brubaker & Willy Østreng, The Northern Sea Route Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?, 30 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L LAW 304 (1999)).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes how the international community governs the
environment of the Arctic and whether that community, or parts of it, should be
governing the Arctic differently. At this Article’s core is a description of programs
specifically created to protect and manage that regional sea. More broadly, it
provides an overview of the great range of policy and regulatory activity that focuses
on the environmental quality of the Arctic. The aim of this Article is not only to
describe and evaluate existing governance structures but also to indicate how
governance can be improved.
This is a study of a very special case. The United Nations Environmental
Programme describes the region in this way: “Its terrain varies from high mountains
to flat plain, wide tundra and great expanses of sea, snow and ice. The plants and
animals of the Arctic have adapted to these conditions, but this has rendered them
in some cases more sensitive to increased human activities.”2
The Arctic is sparsely populated, but much more so than its polar
counterpart—Antarctica. It has had a significant indigenous people population for
more than 4000 years.3 According to estimates, one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas
resources are in the Arctic. In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
estimated that areas north of the Arctic Circle may have thirteen percent of the
undiscovered oil, thirty percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and twenty percent
of the undiscovered natural gas liquids on Earth.4 Most of these resources are
offshore.5 The Arctic is characterized by the presence of important minerals,
significant biodiversity, and animal and marine life, although there is currently no
commercial fishing in the high seas of the Arctic.
By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Arctic may
be free of ice during the summer months. Concomitant with this change, climate
change will result in releases of methane from the permafrost and acidification of
the sea.6 Other atmospheric changes have been identified. High levels of extremely
reactive molecular chlorine have been discovered in the Arctic atmosphere.7 Oil and
gas development will bring change and create additional environmental challenges.
The United States, the Russian Federation, Norway, and Canada are among the
nations working on exploitation activities in various stages. Some of the nineteen
2. Arctic Region, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/independent/
arctic/ [https://perma.cc/UR2W-3QBE] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
3. See Arctic Chronology, AVATAQ CULTURAL INST., http://www.avataq.qc.ca/en/Institute/
Departments/Archaeology/Discovering-Archaeology/Arctic-Chronology [https://perma.cc/2GMBZTBP] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
4. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic, USGS
( July 23, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980 [https://perma.cc/
7LXV-3WLH].
5. See id.
6. See Oran R. Young, The Future of the Arctic: Cauldron of Conflict or Zone of Peace?, INT’L AFF., Jan.
2011, at 185, 187.
7. See Jin Liao et al., High Levels of Molecular Chlorine in the Arctic Atmosphere, 7 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 91, 91 (2014).
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geological basins making up the Arctic have already experienced oil and gas
exploration.8 With the opening of this area comes increased resource exploitation
and a greatly increased volume of shipping though the more easily navigated
passages, leading to an increased probability of accidents and spills of diesel and
other fuels. Shipping not only comes with the usual maritime dumpings and leaks,
but also a potential threat from one of the devices allowing opening of the region
itself: the immensely powerful nuclear ice-breaking submarine. The environmental
risks associated with new oil and gas extraction also include associated effects on
land. Extraction requires the drawing of pipelines across tundra areas, from the
Arctic shorelines to more densely populated parts of the world. The areas affected
by such pipelines are sometimes seen as “wasteland” from the perspective of global
metropoles; however, they can have great importance for the survival of local
indigenous civilizations—as reindeer pasture, for example.
All these changes bring to the fore a concern over the international
community’s ability to manage the fragile environment of the Arctic. Is the existing
framework adequate? Is it potentially adequate?
In what follows, I first describe the clusters of laws, policies, and other
initiatives—national, regional, and international—that are in place to govern the
Arctic. I then briefly summarize the debate over whether new law, including
comprehensive Arctic treaty law, is needed. Recognizing that this debate will go on
for some time and its outcome will not affect my main position, I then focus on the
need to work with existing law. Converting the law to activity that makes a
difference in practice—making the law work—is the objective: the implementation
of existing good initiatives. My objective is to make the law work—that is, to
convert the law into activity that makes a difference in practice. In other words, I
argue for the implementation of good existing initiatives. My emphasis on
implementation comes from a recognition that a paralysis exists in nation state
compliance with some international laws because of the large number of obligations
that nations have assumed. In addition, this emphasis results from an appreciation
that the processes of lawmaking do not include assessment of the feasibility of
implementing the commitments made. It is often not clear how to put into effect
legal obligations assumed under international law. The aggregate of commitments
can be overwhelming. Implementation requires prioritizing and working to make a
difference on the ground (or, in our case, the sea). Many commitments in the law
aimed at improving the quality of the environment in the Arctic are not selfexecuting, either in the traditional public law meaning of that term, or in the
meaning focused on here of changing behaviors that link to environmental quality
of the Arctic. This Article aims to assist in putting into practice necessary changes
by thinking through specific steps: Who should or must cooperate? By when? With
what monitoring and reporting obligations? Over what time frame? Who (which
8. See, e.g., Robert Meneley, How to Look at Frontier Basins: An Example from the Canadian
Arctic (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2015/10724meneley/
ndx_meneley.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VD6-E7LB].
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agents) will do what, and by when?
I therefore lay out my working definition of implementation, distinguishing
that definition from the traditional use in international public law. Anticipating what
I develop in this Article, I then lay out lessons that come from several decades of
analysis of the effectiveness of international environmental and related initiatives—
international environmental law generally, as well as the law governing selected
other regional seas. Especially useful are implementation correlates in the Baltic
region and in the Mediterranean. I point out how these lessons emphasize the need
to make operational the law of the sea, the promising requirements of the Regional
Seas Programme, and the large marine ecosystems and other ecological institutional
management concepts. I also lay out some very specific recommendations at the
end of this Article. The first Part, which can be skimmed by the reader familiar with
Arctic environmental law, describes the region and inventories the legal framework
of its governance.
I. CONTEXT—THE ARCTIC: A REGION OF THE CENTURY
International attention on the Arctic has increased dramatically in recent years.
This region is a focus of hope and concern for the twenty-first century. Unlike its
southern polar counterpart, the Arctic is an ocean—the world’s smallest and most
shallow.9 There is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic Region.10 “A
working definition [of the Arctic region] might include ‘the tree line (the
northernmost boundary where trees grow) or the 10 °C isotherm (the southernmost
location where the mean temperature of the warmest month of the year is below
10° C).’”11 Geographically, other [analysts] conclude that [the Arctic through] the
Arctic Circle begins at 66°, 33” latitude.12 For certain international law purposes,
the Arctic is defined by memberships in institutions and governance mechanisms
of the entities in the ‘Arctic region.’”13
A. Ways of Understanding the Arctic Governance Challenge
To understand the governance structure that has evolved in the region, one
9. Raz Barnea, What Risks Remain?: Maritime Activity and the New Calculus of Risk in the North
American Arctic 12 n.32 ( July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466036.
10. Timo Koivurova & Sébastien Duyck, A New Ocean to Govern: Drawing on Lessons from Marine
Management to Govern the Emerging Arctic Ocean, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 179, 180 (David Leary & Balakrishna Pisupati eds., 2010).
11. Joseph F.C. DiMento & Hermanni Backer, Environmental Governance of the Great Seas—The
Arctic: The Region of the Century, MEPIELAN CTR.: MEPIELAN E-BULLETIN (Feb. 18, 2014) (citing Timo
Koivurova & Sebastien Duyck, A New Ocean to Govern: Drawing on the Lessons Learned in Marine Management
to Govern the Emerging Arctic Ocean, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 180
(David Leary & Balakrishna Pisupati eds., 2010)), http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/
default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=2&ArticleId=173&Article=Environmental-Governance-of-theGreat-Seas-%E2%80%94-The-Arctic-The-Region-of-the-Century [https://perma.cc/39FD-QULX].
12. Id.
13. Id.
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might look to theoretical understandings of the international relations of member
entities( i.e., the Arctic States). However, as Geir Honneland notes, articles on the
politics of the Arctic have been “largely descriptive, partly speculative.”14 Despite a
“largely empirical orientation” and the fact that very few articles took theory as their
point of departure, three major theory traditions are identifiable: realism,
institutionalism, and constructivism.15 “‘By and large, the journal literature on the
politics of the Arctic has not contributed to development of theory’—Oran
Young’s work on the development of institutionalist theory and Iver B. Neumann’s
work on regime building being exceptional.”16
Also, a few scholars attempting to understand relevant international dynamics
have looked to game theory as a heuristic.17 From this perspective, the Arctic region
holds “possibilities of huge strategic, economic[al], and geopolitical gains (new
navigation routes, energy resources, minerals etc.).”18 A race among Canada, the
United States, Russia, Norway, and Denmark may develop as their claims often
overlap. Coupled with gaps in international law, in this understanding there is the
potential of a zero-sum game: every state plays for itself. At the same time, the
possibility of cooperation exists among the rim states. States can create a win-win
outcome. A zero-sum outcome may result if the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf gives sovereign rights to only some rim states. Even here the zerosum could be avoided: some rim states cannot exploit the energy resources.
The game becomes complicated further as new actors seek to play. Here the
rim states face a situation of competition with newcomers. Three different
outcomes are possible:
[A]ll rim states cooperate to contain the new comers; some rim states allow
the new comers to enter the game and cooperate with them defecting in
the view of the other rim states; and thirdly, some of these states act
independently or they all (newcomers and rim-states) act for themselves.
Within the first two scenarios we can have a mix zero sum and win-win
game, while under the last the possibility of a conflict is very high, thus a
zero-sum outcome is predictable. . . . “[S]tates may be talking cooperation, but
they are preparing for Conflict”. . . .19

14. Geir Hønneland, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC, at xiii, xv (Geir Hønneland
ed., 2013).
15. See Øyvind Østerud & Geir Hønneland, Geopolitics and International Governance in the Arctic, 5
ARCTIC REV. ON L. & POL. 156, 169 (2014).
16. Joseph F.C. DiMento, Book Reviews, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 299,
300 (2014); see also Hønneland, supra note 14, at xvi.
17. See, e.g., Ana-Maria Ghimiș, Rim Versus Non-Rim States in the Arctic Region:

Prospects for a Zero-Sum Game or a Win-Win One?, ROM. J. EUR. AFF., Sept. 2013, at 36,
37; see also Scott Cole, Sergei Izmalkov and Eric Sjoberg, Games in the Arctic: applying
game theory insights to Arctic challenges, POLAR RESEARCH, Aug. 8, 2014.
18.
19.

Id. at 49.
Id. (citation omitted).
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B. Conditions and Environmental Challenges
In order to address whether or to what extent the existing legal and governance
framework is sufficient, we need to know the conditions that are the object of
intervention. Perhaps not surprisingly, although at some level those conditions for
some media are known (as is the case for the Great Seas generally), there are many
gaps in our knowledge.20 The World Ocean Assessment (WOA) will be “the first
global integrated assessment of the state of the marine environment, including
socio-economic aspects.”21
Nonetheless, the status of the Arctic region can be partially described. The
biodiversity of the region varies with area: the High Arctic is sparsely vegetated, the
Low Arctic supports more than 600 vascular plant species, the subarctic is a
transition zone and has 100% plant coverage, and the boreal forest consists of
coniferous trees.22 Moreover, permafrost reaches 600–1000 meters in the coldest
areas of the Arctic; wetlands are sparsely distributed and are underlain by
permafrost; and ice is widespread.23 There is low native species diversity in the
Arctic and considerable numbers of opportunistic and invasive species. The Arctic
supports one of the largest seabird populations in the world, over 150 species of
fish (but low numbers of each), and a variety of marine mammals.24
1.

Temperatures

“Arctic average temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of
the world in the past few decades. Widespread melting of glaciers and sea ice and
rising permafrost temperatures present additional evidence of strong arctic
warming.”25 Predictions of temperature increases in the region show some
variability: all five of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) global climate
models show, with two different emissions scenarios, about a 2 °C temperature rise
through about 2040. Post-2040, the models diverge, showing increases from around
4 °C to over 7 °C by 2100.26

20. See JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO & ALEXIS JACLYN HICKMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT SEAS: LAW AND EFFECT 1 (2012).
21. Betsy Baker, A Note on Arctic Information Platforms and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DONAT PHARAND 434, 443
(Suzanne Lalonde & Ted L. McDorman eds., 2015) (citation omitted).
22. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC REGION 4 (n.d.),
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/independent/arctic/instruments/
r_profile_pame.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7BW-UDKX].
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, IMPACTS OF A
WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ACIA) OVERVIEW REPORT 8 (2004),
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786.
26. These climate models are computer simulations represented by mathematical equations.
Major components of the climate system included are the atmosphere, oceans, land surface, snow and
ice, living things, and the various interacting processes among them. Generally higher confidence exists
for larger scale projections and greater uncertainty for smaller scales. Id. at 27.
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In a region as large and diverse as the Arctic, there are significant subregional
variations in climate. Parts of Canada and Greenland surrounding the Labrador Sea
have experienced cooling in recent years.27 In the Canadian Arctic, average summer
temperatures over the last century “are the highest in the last 44,000 years, and
perhaps the highest in 120,000 years.”28
2.

Atmosphere

High levels of extremely reactive molecular chlorine have been discovered in
the Arctic atmosphere: “the first time that molecular chlorine has been measured
in the Arctic, and the first time that scientists have recorded such high levels of
molecular chlorine in the atmosphere.”29
Most expert observers consider climate change to be the greatest threat to the
Arctic and its most serious challenge. The Arctic is “on the front line” of the climate
change fight.30 “It has been estimated that . . . the change there will be twice as
intense as the change in other regions of the world.”31 To be sure, changes in climate
will provide opportunities for development in the region—with associated benefits.
The Executive Summary for Arctic Climate Change and Its Impacts demonstrates
the complexity of the predictions: “The Arctic also provides important natural
resources to the rest of the world (such as oil, gas, and fish) that will be affected by
climate change. And melting of arctic glaciers is one of the factors contributing to
sea-level rise around the globe.”32 The Assessment recognizes that whether a
particular impact is perceived as negative or positive “often depends on one’s
interests. For example, the reduction in sea ice is very likely to have devastating
consequences for polar bears, ice-dependent seals, and local people for whom these
animals are a primary food source.”33 However, reduced sea ice is likely to increase
marine access to the region’s resources, expanding opportunities for shipping and
possibly for offshore oil extraction (although operations could be hampered initially
by increasing movement of ice in some areas). Also, complicating the issue, possible
increases in environmental damage that often accompanies shipping and resource
extraction could harm the marine habitat and health and traditional lifestyles.
Tree growth in the Arctic could take up carbon dioxide and supply more wood
27.
28.

See id. at 18.
Douglas Main, Arctic Temperatures Highest in at Least 44,000 Years, LIVESCIENCE (Oct. 24,
2013,
11:13
AM),
http://www.livescience.com/40676-arctic-temperatures-record-high.html
[https://perma.cc/22ET-V8G9].
29. James Fluere, High Levels of Extremely Reactive Molecular Chlorine Discovered in Arctic Atmosphere,
SCI. RECORDER ( Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.sciencerecorder.com/news/2014/01/13/high-levels-ofmolecular-chlorine-discovered-in-arctic-atmosphere/ [https://perma.cc/RE4L-7SUR].
30. The Newkirk Center for Science and Society, The Role of Law and Governance in Preserving the
Arctic Environment, YOUTUBE (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEda3E
bIJys&list=PL1E91860CF029CF95&index=9.
31. Timo Koivurova, The Dialectic of Understanding Progress in Arctic Governance, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 5 (2013).
32. Hassol, supra note 25, at 8.
33. Id.
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products that generate employment and other economic benefits. Tree growth is
likely to add to regional warming and encroach on the habitat for many birds,
reindeer/caribou, and other locally beneficial species. Forest fires and insect
outbreaks may reduce expected benefits. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
notes that “levels of ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth’s surface due to
stratospheric ozone depletion” may be influenced by climate change on the upper
atmosphere.34 Arctic ultraviolet radiation levels are likely to remain elevated,
especially in the spring. These stressors present a range of potential problems for
human and ecosystem health.
The probability of accidents and spills of diesel and other fuels increases as
the number of ships going through the more easily navigated passages increases by
many times (and oil does not degrade in water at 31ºF). Threats arise not only from
the usual dumpings and leaks from ships but also from one of the devices that is
allowing opening of the region itself: the immensely powerful nuclear ice-breaking
submarine. Nuclear-powered vessels can have important effects on the area. They
can open up the Arctic to new activities and to increased commerce. When safe and
controlled, they can be a relatively clean form of energy for some uses in the region.
However, when problems do arise they can be serious, and the resulting accidents
can be immensely challenging.
C. Governance
“Governance . . . is the totality of activities that seek to provide rational
effective management of the seas.”35 The term “lack[s] specificity in the literature
and in public policy considerations. Current calls by international institutions for
‘good governance’ are not often well-articulated and commonly lead to formless
outcomes. The activities . . . include[d] within governance come from various
institutions, broadly defined, including the law.”36 Governance involves the
activities of a number of international initiatives and regimes. Regimes are the
aggregation of laws and policies, rules, norms, and institutions that work to achieve
a common international objective. These partly or fully established systems make
up the context from which marine environmental management is derived. Their
foundations, whether strong or weak, create the conditions for processes of
governance.
D. The Cluster
Attempts at governance are numerous and often complicated. Moreover, they
do not always mesh into a coherent, understandable, and workable framework. I
use the less optimistic term “clusters” when those characteristics are relevant to
governance attempts. “Cluster” denotes that collection of initiatives and regimes
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 9.
DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 7.
Id.
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that target a particular international objective. I describe this as less optimistic for
reasons that follow, but in short, the aggregation of initiatives that focus on a
phenomenon to be improved may not work together in an effective manner. There
are many meanings in the social sciences and policy analysis of this term; for the
present purpose, “cluster” describes the aggregation of attempts to improve the
Arctic. It is the collection, sometimes coordinated, sometimes less so, of
international environmental institutions, regimes, and complexes.37 Kal Raustiala
and David G. Victor (not using the term cluster) speak of a regime complex as “a
collective of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes” that develop in
special, often path-dependent ways;38 they are “laden with legal inconsistencies”
because the rules in one regime are rarely negotiated in the same institution or at
the same time as rules in related regimes.39 The phenomenon results in part from

37. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (1998); ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999); Frank Biermann,
‘Earth System Governance’ as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
326 (2007); Charlotte N.L. Chambers, Pasua and the Politics of Environmental Management, Tongareva, Cook
Islands, 124 SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL J. 192 (2008); Thomas Gehring & Sebastian Oberthür, The
Causal Mechanisms of Interaction Between International Institutions, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 125 (2009); Robert
O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011);
Sebastian Oberthür, Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations, 2 INT’L
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 317 (2002); Sebastian Oberthür & Thomas Gehring,
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade
Organization, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2006, at 1; Konrad von Moltke, Clustering International
Environmental Agreements as an Alternative to a World Environment Organization, in A WORLD ENVIRONMENT
ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann & Steffen Bauer eds., 2005).
38. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG.
277, 277 (2004).
39. See id.
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increasing institutional density.40 Overlapping, nonhierarchical, often inconsistent,
often unconditional: these are characteristics of a cluster.41
E. Arctic Region and Cluster
For the present case, the cluster is very large. Here I present its major
components. Readers familiar with Arctic law can move on to the implementation
analysis below. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the “constitution” for the seas, is of fundamental importance to governance of the
Arctic.42 UNCLOS directs sovereign activities of Arctic states in the Arctic. The
fifth Arctic state, the United States, recognizes the main provisions of UNCLOS as
customary international law.43
40. In the present case, the members of the inventory of legal initiatives cluster together
relatively high on the axes of environmental protection (x) and the target media as the Arctic (y). Figure
1 shows the general regional seas conceptualization. Absence of coordination exists internally and
internationally among those who work to implement cluster initiatives. In some countries, the same
ministries or agencies are involved for some initiatives. In others, interagency coordination—such as
between foreign affairs or defense and the environment or trade and agriculture—is not strong.
Coordination even among allies and affiliate groups (e.g., BRICS, The Group of 77, Europe and North
America) is often inconsistent and weak.

41. See generally Christoph Humrich, Fragmented International Governance of Arctic Offshore Oil:
Governance Challenges and Institutional Improvement, GLOB. ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2013, at 79, 79–99
(examining “actor constellations” in fragmented structure of Arctic governance architecture and arguing
that a joint enabling effort is necessary).
42. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
43. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (“The United States has not
ratified [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], but has recognized that its baseline
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The main principle employed by UNCLOS is that of zoning. Most of the
world’s nations (now around 160) agree to create demarcations of the waters,
regulating what can be done within each of these limited arenas. Various elements
or degrees of sovereignty exist in the zones, from the internal waters to the high
seas, as Figure 2 shows.

Figure 2: UNCLOS Zones (Source: Australian Geological Survey).

In the internal waters, states have absolute sovereignty,44 except for limitations
created by other treaties or limitations existing under customary international law.
The next zone is that of the Territorial Seas. These are defined as extending
twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with the
Convention.45 In this zone, there exists the right of innocent passage and of transit
passage. The territorial waters are followed by the Contiguous Zones, extending
twelve to twenty-four nautical miles measured from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured.46 In this zone, coastal state regulatory authority extends
over customs, fiscal transactions, immigration, the management of wastes, and
shipwrecks.
Beyond these areas are the Continental Shelf (CS) and the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). The CS is the area where resources and activities of the
seabed and subsoil under the ocean are controlled. The CS extends throughout the
natural prolongation of a nation’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin or 200 miles—or more in some circumstances (technology can allow
extensions). Here, the state holds sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting its natural resources.47 The EEZ governs the resources and activities in
provisions reflect customary international law.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for United States
at 25 n.6, Alaska, 503 U.S. 569); United States v. Kun Yun Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2008)
(declaring that “[t]he United States is not a party to UNCLOS as the Senate has not ratified the treaty,”
while acknowledging that UNCLOS can reflect customary international law).
44. See UNCLOS, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 1.
45. Id. art. 3.
46. Id. art. 33, paras. 1–2.
47. See id. art. 76, para. 1; id. art. 77, paras. 1, 4.
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the water column and ocean surface and can extend 200 nautical miles from the
shore; it is generally coextensive with the CS.48
Beyond these zones are the high seas and within them the “Area” (“the seabed
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”),
where the resources are the “common heritage of mankind.”49 For these resources,
UNCLOS has established the Enterprise and the International Seabed Authority
for control and management activities in the Area: “All rights in the resources of
the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act.
These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area,
however, may only be alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority.”50
Of central interest for our purposes, Part XII of UNCLOS addresses
environmental protection of the marine environment. Under Article 192, “[s]tates
have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.”51 This general
obligation must be fulfilled through the adoption, individually or jointly, of
measures addressing pollution from various sources, such as ships, land-based
discharges, seabed exploitation, and dumping. UNCLOS also provides that states
shall take measures “necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms
of marine life.”52 States must also act to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from
any source using the “best practicable means at their disposal.”53
UNCLOS includes active obligations on the part of states to protect and
preserve the marine environment, as well as to cooperate on a global or regional
basis “directly or through competent international organizations” to protect and
preserve the marine environment.54 In addition, UNCLOS addresses specific
pollution sources: “Pollution from Land-Based Sources 1: States shall adopt laws
and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from land-based sources . . . . Coastal states shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in
connection with sea bed activities . . . .”55 Article 209 covers pollution from
activities in the Area; Article 210, pollution by dumping; and Article 211, pollution
from vessels.56
Under UNCLOS, states have an obligation to take measures for their own
nationals for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; to cooperate
with other states in the conservation and management of those resources; and to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. art. 55; id. art. 56, para. 1; id. art. 57; id. art. 76, para. 1.
Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 136.
Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 137, para. 2; id. art. 170.
Id. art. 192.
Id. art. 194, para. 5.
Id. art. 194, para. 1.
See id. art. 197.
Id. art. 207, para 1; id. art. 208, para 1.
Id. art. 209–11.
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base those measures on the best scientific evidence available, environmental and
economic factors, and international standards.57
A major player in developing rules for activities in the marine environment is
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), both through the use of treaties
and “soft law” codes. Other relevant laws include the 1972 London Convention58
regarding the dumping of wastes at sea and MARPOL,59 which manages the
operational discharge of oil. Article 218(1) of UNCLOS states that “[w]hen a vessel
is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State,” that State can
institute proceedings for discharges occurring outside the port state’s territorial sea
or EEZ.60
Based on UNCLOS, “it is still very much the coastal states that are responsible
for managing the ocean . . . the Arctic Ocean is to a large extent subject to the
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of its coastal states and art. 234 of the LOS
Convention even accords those states expanded powers to coastal shipping in the
ice-covered areas. However, the central Arctic Ocean is high seas.”61
Other relevant parts of the Law of the Sea that make up part of the cluster are
articles 64, 65, and 120, which apply to marine mammals in the EEZ. Article 64
requires states whose nationals fish for highly migratory species to cooperate
directly or through appropriate international organizations; Article 65 provides that
coastal states may regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than
as otherwise provided for in Part B; and Article 120 applies Article 65 to the
conservation and management of marine mammals in the high seas.62
F. Territorial Determinants
Behind many worldwide environmental governance challenges are questions
of territorial control. Control of land-based pollution and proper maintenance of
oil exploration, exploitation, and transportation, for example, are functions of
sovereign nations. When there are areas in dispute, effective environmental
governance can be stymied.
In the Arctic there have been surprisingly few disputes. An important potential
point of tension existed between Norway and Russia in the Novaya Zemlya
archipelago (Russian side) and the Svalbard archipelago (Norway), but it was
peacefully resolved in 2010.63 There are a few others. One involves the tiny Hans

57. Id. art. 117–18; id. art. 119, para. 1.
58. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London Convention].
59. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S. 62 [hereinafter MARPOL].
60. UNCLOS, supra note 42, at art. 218, para. 1.
61. Koivurova & Duyck, supra note 10, at 184.
62. UNCLOS, supra note 42, at art. 64–65, 120.
63. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia-Norway Pact on Sea Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A12.
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Island, but even this disagreement may be easily resolved.64 Another involves the
United States and Russia in the Bering Sea. Here, there has been a negotiated
maritime boundary of 1,000 nautical miles laying out fishing zones and rights, which
are respected, although the Russian Duma has not yet ratified the agreement.65
Another dispute is between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.66
Terence Andrew Check, Jr. may be an outlier, but he strongly contends that
“there is still no structure to provide orderly development in the unclaimed and
disputed Arctic.”67 He also argues that “[a]nother unique issue posed by UNCLOS
that is exacerbated by the political instability in the Arctic comes from Articles 122
and 123, where, under a specific interpretation of these articles, the Arctic may not
be open sea at all, but rather a semi-enclosed sea that conveys additional duties of
cooperation on the Arctic Five.”68 He concludes that “UNCLOS is silent on the
issue of appeals of CLCS [(Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf)]
decisions, and it is unclear if there is any proper or workable way to appeal and
adjudicate such appeals.”69 Finally, he points out that “it is not even clear if CLCS
rulings are even binding under customary international law, given the body’s lack of
history and paucity of rulings.”70
Finally, there is the 2013 claim to the North Pole by Canada.71 This is an area
where Russia—and, to a lesser extent, Denmark—have claims.72 However, Canada
has met its obligation under the ten-year deadline of filing in order to justify
Continental Shelf claims beyond the 200-mile “default” limit.73

64. See MICHAEL BYERS WITH JAMES BAKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 14–15
(2013).
65. See Status of Wrangel and Other Arctic Islands, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/128740.htm [https://perma.cc/D685-69AY].
66. There are some who disagree with this sanguine assessment. See Ghimiş, supra note 17, at
38–40 (“[E]ven the international law could create a zero sum situation in the Arctic, considering the
fact that following the legal status of the Arctic, everyone has the right to exploit the Arctic resources,
because it is an international territory . . . ‘[t]he exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether landlocked
or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries.’ These provisions
could be applied to the areas beyond the 200 miles or in the case of an International Court’s decision,
in which no rim state gains sovereign rights over some Arctic territories.” (quoting G.A. Res. 2749
(XXV), para. 7 (Dec. 12, 1970))).
67. Terence Andrew Check, Jr., Finding the Right Forum: The Need for Novel Multilateral Diplomatic
Solutions to Resolve Competing Territorial Claims Over the Arctic’s Natural Resources (Oct. 30, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347706.
68. Id. at n.61.
69. Id. at n.67.
70. Id. at n.77.
71. Canada to Include the North Pole in Its Claim for Arctic Territory, Resources, RT QUESTION
MORE (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:27 AM), http://rt.com/news/canada-arctic-north-pole-claims-965
[https://perma.cc/3EA6-7RA5].
72. See Angelle C. Smith, Note, Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved
to Prevent the Really Cold War, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2010).
73. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Seven-Decade Quest to Maximize Canada’s Continental Shelf, 69
INT’L J. 422, 438 (2014).
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II. REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND THE REGIONAL
ASPECT OF A GENERAL OBLIGATION
A. The Regional Seas
The Arctic program is a partner program, along with the Antarctic, the Baltic,
the Caspian, and North-East Atlantic regional seas programs, which are all part of
the United Nations Regional Seas Programme. Partner programs are less formally
connected with the UN than other regional seas programs.74
The Governing Council of UNEP has defined the objective of the Regional
Seas Programme as the development and implementation of comprehensive action
plans for the protection and development of specific regional seas areas for
consideration by Governments concerned and to support their implementation.75
Usable strategies include those relevant to the Arctic governance question, such as
the following: promotion of international and regional conventions; guidelines and
actions for the control of marine pollution and for the protection of aquatic
resources; assessment of the state of marine pollution and its sources and trends;
assessment of the impact of pollution on human health, the marine ecosystem, and
amenities; and coordination of these efforts with regard to the environmental
aspects of the protection, development, and management of marine and coastal
resources.
Common elements of the programs are summarized in Table 2, which
indicates that the Arctic program is, somewhat in form and somewhat in function,
a regional seas program. There are calls for formalizing and strengthening the Arctic
regional seas institution.76
74. Other programs function through an Action Plan. See Regional Seas Action Plans, UNEP,
http://hqweb.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/actionplans [https://perma.cc/XJJ9-ZEM7] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (explaining the details of Action Plans). In many cases, the Action Plan is
underpinned with a strong legal framework in the form of a regional convention and associated
protocols on specific problems. There are now thirteen regional seas programs, of which six are UNEP
administered. With varying levels of participation, 149 countries (ninety-five percent of the world’s
states) are a part of programs that include the Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East Asian Seas (COBSEA),
Eastern Africa, South Asian Seas, ROPME Sea Area, Mediterranean, North-East Pacific, North-West
Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South-East Pacific, Pacific, and Western Africa. About, UNEP,
http://hqweb.unep.org/regionalseas/about/ [https://perma.cc/E7SB-P6XV] (last visited Mar. 7,
2016). The programs cover eighteen regions of the world. The Regional Seas Programmes, UNEP,
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/ [https://perma.cc/4K6X-9SW9] (last visited Mar.
7, 2016). In Decision 20/20 (1999), the governing council of UNEP endorsed the establishment of a
regional seas program for the East Central Pacific Region. See Establishment of a Regional Seas
Programme for the East Central Pacific, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=117&ArticleID=1849&l=en [https://perma.cc/RD6M-BBCZ] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
75. See UNEP, GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE PREPARATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLANS FOR THE PROTECTION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE AND COASTAL AREAS OF REGIONAL SEAS, at i–ii (1982),
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/publications/reports/RSRS/pdfs/rsrs015.pdf [http://
web.archive.org/web/20160309220156/http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/publications/reports/
RSRS/pdfs/rsrs015.pdf].
76. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS’ REPORT TO MINISTERS (2015),
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PROGRAMME

Secretariat
Yes or no

Conventions
Yes or no
and #

Caribbean

Yes

Yes - 4

East African
Region
East Asian Seas

Yes

Yes - 3

Yes

No

Mediterranean
Sea
Northwest
Pacific Region
West and
Central African
Region

Yes

Yes - 7

Yes

No

Yes

Yes - 2

Regional
Coordinating
Unit: yes or
no & where
Kingston,
Jamaica
Seychelles,
Somalia
Bangkok,
Thailand
Athens,
Greece
No
Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire

Environmental
Assessment
Component

Environmental
Management
Component

Environmental
Legislation
Component

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No-evaluative

Yes

Yes

No

Regional Seas Coordinating Units of other Institution, not UNEP
Black Sea
Yes
Yes - 4
Istanbul,
Turkey
North-East
No
Yes - 1
No
Pacific Region
ROPME Sea
Yes
Yes - 5
No
Area
Red Sea and
Yes
Yes - 2
Jeddah, Saudi
Gulf of Aden
Arabia
South Asian Seas Yes
No
Colombo,
Sri Lanka
South-East
Yes
Yes - 7
Quito,
Pacific
Ecuador
South Pacific
Yes
Yes - 3
Apia, Western
Region
Samoa
Other Regional Seas Programmes
Arctic Region
Yes
No
Antarctic Region

Yes

Yes - 1

The Baltic Sea

Yes

Yes - 1

Caspian Sea
North-East
Atlantic Region

No
Yes

Yes - 1
Yes - 1
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Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Iceland

No

No

No

Tasmania,
Australia
Helsinki,
Finland
Tehran, Iran
London,
England

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Some programs have as their core activity the creation of regional action plans
for the protection and development of marine and coastal areas.77 Marine pollution
control was an original focus of the plans. Later, the focus of the action plans shifted
to integrated coastal zone planning and management.78 “It also early on became
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/494/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_
Iqaluit_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_formatted_v.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC2-QJ5K]; Betsy
Baker, ICES, PICES and the Arctic Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, 6 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 1 (2016).
77. These exist for the Mediterranean (1975), Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (1976), Gulf (1978),
Wider Caribbean (1981), East Asian Seas (1981), West and Central African (1981), South Pacific (1982),
and Eastern Africa (1985). See The Regional Seas Programmes, UNEP, http://hqweb.unep.org/
regionalseas/programmes/ [https://perma.cc/4K6X-9SW9] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
78. Stjepan Keckes, The Regional Seas Programme–Integrating Environment and Development: The Next
Phase, in OCEAN GOVERNANCE: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEAS 139, 141 (Peter Bautista
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apparent that land based pollution needed to be controlled if the regional seas were
to be protected.”79 Several regions adopted legal conventions that commit members
to protect and enhance the relevant marine environment—usually up to the EEZ.
High seas, enclosed from all sides by the 200-mile zone of the member states, are
also included in the convention area in a small number of cases.80 These include
Cartagena and Noumea. These recognitions have implications for our focus on
implementation and are addressed below.
III. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
Whether considered a part of a regional seas framework or not, a main
evolving component of the governance framework for the Arctic is the Arctic
Council.
A. Background
In 1987, then Soviet Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic
states could initiate cooperation in various fields.81 In the environmental sector,
Finland convened a conference of the eight Arctic states in Rovaniemi in 1991.
There they signed the Rovaniemi Declaration, thereby adopting the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).82
AEPS was a nonbinding environmental protection agreement among the
Arctic nations (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden, and the United States). Some indigenous peoples of the Arctic also are
represented through the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). The IPS represents
three AEPS Permanent Participants: the SAAMI Council (Nordic and Western
Russia), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (U.S., Canada, Greenland, and Russia),
and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East
of the Russian Federation.83
Adoption of the AEPS was motivated by: the former Soviet Union’s reported
dumping of radioactive and other hazardous materials into the Arctic Ocean, which
sent a message to the international community of potential environmental and
human health threats; the Russian Federation’s willingness to address these
problems “in their search for bilateral and multilateral assistance to clean up and
manage present and future problems”; and scientific studies describing “abnormally
high levels of persistent organic pollutants and heavy metals in Arctic indigenous
Payoyo ed., 1994).
79. DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 24.
80. Keckes, supra note 78, at 141.
81. Paul Arthur Berkman, Arctic Ocean State-Changes: Self Interests and Common Interests, in 1 THE
YEARBOOK OF POLAR LAW 511, 517–18 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2009).
82. See Ministerial Direction, EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE,
http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/reports/ministerial-direction/ [https://perma.cc/R6US-J6GU]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
83. Bruce A. Russell, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the New Arctic Council, ARCTIC
RES. U.S., Fall–Winter 1996, at 2.
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people and their food sources.”84 These pollutants were said to probably result from
transport mechanisms from northern industrial nations.85 Five programs were
established under AEPS:
1. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP);
2. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna program (CAFF);
3. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME);
4. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group
(EPPR); and
5. Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU).86
In 1996, the eight Arctic nations signed a declaration that created the Arctic
Council.87 This Council is a consensus forum that provides a means for cooperation,
coordination, and interaction among the eight Arctic states and the Arctic peoples
(native and others) with regard to common environmental and sustainable
development issues. The Council subsumed the five AEPS programs.
The Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council extended the
terms of reference beyond environmental protection. Although the Council’s
mandate is quite broad, it does not address issues related to military security.88 The
Council includes the governments of Canada, Russia, Denmark (including
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, the United States, Sweden, Finland, and
Iceland, and also, uniquely, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic: the Athabaskan,
Aleut, Gwich’in, Inuit, Sami, and the forty-one indigenous peoples in Russia
represented by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
(RAIPON).89
In addition, some states and entities with Arctic interests are involved with the
Council as observers. Full membership, including voting rights, in the Council is
restricted to the eight countries with territory in the region. The organizations
representing the Arctic indigenous peoples have Permanent Participant status, but
this group is now outnumbered by twelve other states that have been admitted with
observer status and can attend meetings.90
84. Id.
85. Ministerial Direction, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, art. 2, Sept. 19,
1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387.
88. Id. at art. 1, n.1.
89. Id. at art. 2; Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/NPK6-6UZM]; see
also The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, Sept. 16, 1993, princ. 7,
1993 WL 645202 [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration] (“We recognize the special role of the indigenous
peoples in environmental management and development in the Arctic, and of the significance of their
knowledge and traditional practices, and will promote their effective participation in the achievement
of sustainable development in the Arctic.”).
90. The observer nations are China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr.
27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers
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The Council does not have an international legal personality because, under
international law, that term is used to denote that the entity (separate from its
members) is recognized under the law and capable of participating as a member in
international decisions. The term also denotes that the entity (state, international
company, etc.) has a legal name, rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities, and
liabilities under law just as any person does.91
The Council now has a Secretariat and a rotating Chair. The Chair nation has
responsibility for maintaining the Secretariat, which handles the administrative
aspects of the Council by calling meetings, managing its website, and circulating
documents.
With the major environmental challenges noted above and significant
geopolitical changes in the region, the Council has evolved from a fairly obscure
international organization to one of increasing importance in Arctic governance.
The Council generally creates nonbinding guidelines, but it has taken upon itself a
convening role for states to consider entering treaties.
In 2011, the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement became the first binding
treaty concluded under the Council’s auspices.92 In 2013, the “Agreement on
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic”
was signed.93 It aims to establish a framework to substantially improve the
procedures for tackling oil spills in the Circumpolar region. Other agreements under
negotiation include those on pollution prevention, science, and fisheries.94
B. Other Entities in the Arctic Cluster
In addition to the Arctic Council, elements of Arctic environmental
governance are addressed in other international fora, including the Spitsbergen
Treaty, the North Atlantic Coastguard Forum, and the Conference of the
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. Moreover, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) is developing a draft international code of safety for ships
operating in polar waters (the Polar Code).95
[https://perma.cc/Y4JE-26Z3]. The European Union has also lobbied for observer status, so far
unsuccessfully. Lily Haines, EU Bid to Become Arctic Council Observer Deferred Again, BARENTS OBSERVER
(May 4, 2015), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/eu-bid-become-arctic-councilobserver-deferred-again-04-05 [https://perma.cc/ED38-HR5N].
91. See Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 293–94 (1928); Nneoma Chigozie
Udeariry, To What Extent do International Organizations Possess International Legal Personality?11 (Sept. 15,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2052555.
92. Steven Lee Myers, Cooperation is Pledged by Nations of the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2011, at A12.
93. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the
Arctic (May 15, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm [https://perma.cc/
3JCK-22DL] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
94. See Steven Lee Myers, Arctic Council Meets in Shadow of Tension on Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2015, at A7; Steven Lee Myers, Sea Warming Leads to Ban on Fishing in the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2015, at A6.
95. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),
Res. MSC.385(94) (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/
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In March 2014, the Arctic Council announced actions to create an Arctic
Economic Council (AEC) “to foster sustainable development, including economic
growth, environmental protection and social development in the Arctic Region.”96
C. Treaties
Arctic nations are members of international legal initiatives, some of which go
back several decades. The region is home to a number of multilevel governance
systems that together comprise what some scholars call the expanding “Arctic
regime complex.”97 Those that affect most or all of the Arctic states are listed in
Table 3.
———————————————————————————————
Table 3. Arctic International Law Cluster Components
 United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea of December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention)
 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the
High Seas
 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR Convention)
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
 International Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS)
 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities
 The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears
 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (The London Convention)
 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)
 The Kyoto Protocol
 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL)

Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED%20BY%20MSC%20AND%
20MEPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VAL-QJHB]; Costas Paris, U.N. Agency Adopts Polar Code to Prevent
Sea Pollution, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-agency-adopts-polar-codeto-prevent-sea-pollution-1431711578 [https://web.archive.org/web/20150602002941/http://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-agency-adopts-polar-code-to-prevent-sea-pollution-1431711578].
96. Agreement on the Arctic Economic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 27, 2014), http://
www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/news-and-press/news-archive/858-agreement-onthe-arctic-economic-council [https://perma.cc/RGM5-5BCX].
97. Oran R. Young, Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times, 41 AMBIO 75, 81 (2012);
see also ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (1998).
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The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-operation
The CMS or Bonn Convention (The Convention on the Conservation on
Migratory Species of Wild Animals)
The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitats (Bern Convention)
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from
Land-based Activities

Also within the cluster are bilateral agreements (e.g., the 1983 CanadaDenmark Agreement) and multilateral agreements (e.g., the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty
signed by Norway, the United States, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas dominions, and
Sweden).
D. Soft Law
Soft law (i.e., generally nonbinding principles that derive from statements in
international meetings, conferences, and other fora aimed at structuring later actions
of the members of the international community) is also relevant to the Arctic, at
least to some of the Arctic states; it includes the Precautionary Principle and the No
Harm Principle.98 Also relevant are the guidelines of international organizations
such as the IMO (e.g. Guidelines on Arctic Shipping).99
Relevant to next steps and the need for additional international law, in 2008
the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation,
and the United States) adopted the Ilulissat Declaration, which concluded that there
is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern
the Arctic ocean.”100 Many observers consider this a strong statement of coastal
98. Lisa B. Uffman-Kirsch, The Prevention Principle: A New Theory for Invocation of State
Responsibility for Marine Environmental Harm (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Utrecht
University) (on file with author).
99. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Nov. 21,
2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE
%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED%20BY%20MSC%20AND%20MEPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CB3D-ESTG]. Some see the need for this principle to be hardened in particular sectors. See Nuuk
Declaration, supra note 89.
100. The relevant text is: “By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in
large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these
possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework
applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . . Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the
marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research,
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement
of any possible overlapping claims.” The Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362. The Arctic
coastal states recognizing the increased use of Arctic water for tourism, shipping, research, and resource
development saw the need to strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic
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state sovereignty over Arctic matters, as it potentially challenges the eight-member
Arctic Council.101
E. Other Cluster Components
1.

Judicial Decisions

The international dispute resolution fora that have jurisdiction in Arctic nation
legal controversies are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the European
Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association
States, and domestic courts. Each of these judicial bodies makes decisions that
aggregate, although not literally with precedential value, to the governance
framework of the Arctic. The international community generally gives respect to
their decision and their logic and reasoning may be applicable to a governance issue
in the Arctic.
Professor Scovazzi has summarized the leading cases on boundary limitations
in the Arctic, including the 1933 dispute between Denmark and Norway over the
legal status of Eastern Greenland; the 1977 200-mile fishery protection zone
adopted by Norway presented to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf; and the 1995 International Court of Justice judgment delimiting the
Continental Shelf and the superjacent waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen.102
There has been a small number of important decisions or opinions of direct
relevance to the environment. For example, in 2013 the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea ordered Moscow to release the Arctic Sunrise and Greenpeace
protesters who had attempted to scale a drilling platform as part of a protest against
Arctic oil production.103 Later, the International Court of Arbitration ordered
Russia to pay compensation for seizing the ship and imprisoning members of its
crew.104 Indigenous Arctic people brought a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, alleging that climate change resulting from global
warming linked to emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States violated their
rights to maintain a traditional way of life. The petition was dismissed.105 Other
Ocean, “including through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between or among relevant states.”
Id.
101. See Klaus Dodds, The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and Arctic
Ocean, SAIS REV. INT’L AFF., Summer–Fall 2013, at 45, 52–53.
102. Scovazzi manuscript on file with the author.
103. The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 22, 2013,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Ord_22_11
_2013_orig_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/75PY-YSLK].
104. Russia Loses Case Over Greenpeace Ship, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.dw.com/en/russia-loses-case-over-greenpeace-ship/a-18669670 [https://perma.cc/
3L56-D8PJ].
105. Anna Ansari, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United
States, CLIMATE CHANGE & HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW, http://guides.brooklaw.edu/
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opinions have addressed northern fur seals, whaling, and oil pollution.106
2.

National Law

When describing the elements of the cluster that fit within elements of
national law, we mean first the exercise of sovereignty in the region, the substantive
law that guides in that sovereign area, as well as (and further complicating the
analysis) the extraterritorial reach of national law.
Sovereignty in the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone established under the
Law of the Sea regime is exercised through individual nation-state law in a range of
areas. Substantive law that implicates relationships within the Arctic states and
relationships between them and other states includes, most importantly for our
environmental analysis, those requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA). In addition to involvement through the Espoo Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment to which all members of the Arctic Council are
parties and its Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (whose parties
include Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), national laws requiring an EIA
are in force in all of the Arctic Council nations.107
The extraterritorial reach of domestic law addressing environmental
conditions can have great significance in the Arctic. There are several relevant
sources, international and domestic. Among the former, Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration imposes upon states the duty to ensure that activity within
their jurisdiction does not cause damage to the environment of another state or the
global commons.108
Domestically, states may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on theories
of territory, effects, and nationality, as well as to protect a national security
interest.109 Domestic law sometimes benefits from internal demands to be
responsive to national or other needs; in such cases it may generate requirements
not easily agreed to at the international level, for example with regard to processes
used to harvest marine resources.

c.php?g=330929&p=2223232 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015).
106. See BYERS, supra note 64, ch. 6, at 171–215.
107. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25,
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 310.
108. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations: Conference on the
Human Environment, at princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 ( June 16, 1972).
109. See Danielle Ireland-Piper, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of the Law
Undermine the Rule of Law?, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 122, 130–31, 136–38 (2012). The territorial rationale is
straightforward in addressing a sovereign’s power to regulate environment-related behavior within the
state’s territory. Id. at 130. The effects touchstone looks to whether activity outside of the state has or
is intended to have a substantial effect within the territory of the state. Id. The principle of nationality
holds that a state can extend the effect of its laws based on the nationality of the person or entity such
as a vessel, whose behavior is targeted. Id. Focusing on the national security of a nation, the protective
principle recognizes prescription of behavior outside of a state, when conduct is directed against the
state’s national security. Id.
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Other Regime Components

There are little bits of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, sometimes called
the donut hole and the peanut hole, in the Arctic.110 Options as to next steps for
addressing these “bits” include activity through the existing Law of the Sea regime.
Here the focus is on implementation of activities in the Areas, for example through
the increasingly relevant Enterprise, the international organization established under
UNCLOS to manage the mineral resources of the area under the principle of the
common heritage of mankind. Existing LOS action in the Areas may need to be
supplemented through multilateral treaties, perhaps with particular foci including
environmental protection.111
4.

An Accounting

The existing Arctic governance system—which we have described
comprehensively, but no doubt not exhaustively—is large and complex. Yet many
scholars and policymakers are not sanguine about its adequacy and they call into
question the effectiveness of the embryonic regime.112 There is, however, a
considerable and deep split in thinking about the need for new law.113 That split
reflects the existing political interests and powers of the Arctic states, of the states
of the Arctic Council, and of Permanent Participants and observers and would-be
observers. But it also results from very different views of what we should expect as
effective environmental governance.114 Also of concern in some regional seas
governance regimes is the question of whether there is too much law resulting in
“treaty paralysis” that overwhelms smaller and less rich nations without capacities
to implement—or perhaps even to participate meaningfully—in negotiations;
however, this does not seem to be a concern for most Arctic stakeholders.
There is a huge literature debating what to include in an assessment of
effectiveness of international environmental initiatives, including what should be
looked at and what methods should be employed.115 An important question relates
to what social scientists call the counterfactual: What would the conditions of the
Arctic be in the absence of the cluster? Further, is the outcome of interest physical
conditions only? Considered the most important indicator by some observers, this
outcome addresses the extent to which actual conditions, or physical parameters, in
the seas have changed over time—in our case, since the beginning of the cluster of
initiatives that have as their goal the maintenance or improvement of the
110. Jon K. Goltz, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft Agreement on
Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 443, 444–45 (1995); David L.
VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 15 Years: Edging Forward in a Sea of Governance Challenges, 54 GER. Y.B.
INT’L LAW 281, 308 (2011).
111. See Rosemary Rayfuse, Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,
17 RECIEL 3, 6–13 (2008).
112. DiMento & Backer, supra note 11.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 27–29.
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environmental quality of the Arctic. Or is the state of investigation insufficiently
developed to look only to physical changes in the giant ocean? Alternate outcomes
might include, for example, cooperation, which is hopefully a precursor to activities
that improve the environmental conditions of the Arctic.
IV. A FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION
“Wise people . . . need to craft rules.”116
In light of the various timetables for predictions of increased challenges to
Arctic conditions, a process is needed for identifying the most serious problems.117
Once these problems have been identified and prioritized, the focus moves towards
implementing methods of solving these problems. In this Article, the focus of
implementation is on the understanding that derives from studies of organizational
behavior. Implementation (in the legal sense of executing international law into
domestic law) may or may not be an activity undertaken first by a nation state; this
step will depend on factors such as whether a nation is a monist or dualist member
of the international community,118 whether nation-state actions can proceed
independent of treaty ratification, etc. Implementation in the sense used in this
Article is the process of putting into effect policies and legal requirements. Here the
focus is on making a difference on the ground, actually effecting behavioral changes.
As Joan Petersilia has noted, “the ideas embodied in innovative social
programs are not self-executing.”119 Instead, what is needed is an “implementation
perspective on innovation—an approach that views postadoption events as crucial and
focuses on the actions of those who convert it into practice as the key to success or
failure.”120
Few would argue against the need for work to make effective attempts at
implementing existing obligations independent of whether new law is indicated.
Implementation analysis is the stepchild in international studies. Thinking through
specific steps to carry out legal obligations (“put into practice an activity or program
of known dimensions”121) may not be as interesting as creating new obligations. But
to assist in having the law make a difference, more attention needs to be paid to
questions such as the following: Which entities (agencies, departments, etc.) within
116. Michael Byers, comment during the Arctic Governance symposium at UC Irvine School
of Law.
117. See, e.g., ENERGY SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE ARCTIC: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Hooman Peimani ed., 2013); Charles K. Ebinger & Evie
Zambetakis, The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt, 85 INT’L AFF. 1215, 1215–16 (2009).
118. For a discussion of the terms “monist” and “dualist,” see Soc’y Am. Law Teachers, A Short
Primer on U.S. Federalism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) 2 (n.d.), http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/
primer_us_federlismintl_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MGG-SFDX].
119. Joan Petersilia, Conditions That Permit Intensive Supervision Programs to Survive, 36 CRIME &
DELINQ. 126, 129 (1990).
120. Id. (emphasis in original).
121. DEAN L. FIXSEN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH: A SYNTHESIS OF THE
LITERATURE 5 (2005).
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nations are targeted for cooperation? Who is responsible for the first step and
various subsequent steps in management? Which agency, department, or bureau
should guide those who are responsible, and according to what timetable? How will
actions of targeted nations and subnational actors be monitored? What reporting
mechanisms are required? Finally, what will happen with reports generated by
monitoring activities? As one successful CEO has described his management
directive: Tell me “who will do what by when?”122
Lessons that can guide successful implementation of relevant Arcticenvironmental law can be found in several places: the study of activities in other
regional seas; case-study work on individual obligations within international
commitments such as coastal zone management; analysis of international
environmental agreement-processing of obligations in general; and the general
knowledge base on implementation. That knowledge base has grown significantly
in the last decades; however, legal scholars are generally either unaware of it or do
not see it as their professional obligation to pursue its application.123
The focus in this Article is on social process: utilizing developed strategies and
techniques to bring together people who can help define the next steps required to
make Arctic environmental law effective. It is also important to bring together
people—often a different set of people—who work for change “on the ground” in
organizational activities and outputs.
In addressing implementation, Arctic stakeholders may benefit from lessons
learned elsewhere. First, in the ongoing developments associated with Arctic
cooperation, some lessons may come from the successes and failures of efforts in
other regional seas.
For example, the value of looking to other regions may be illustrated by the
work undertaken for the Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response
regime. During the ongoing negotiations, Baltic cooperation on oil pollution
preparedness and response under the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was
offered as a good parallel example from a near-Arctic sea with severe ice winters,
even if smaller in size.124 With the signing of the Helsinki Convention in 1974, the
coastal countries of the Baltic managed to foster mutual trust in the middle of the
Cold War period and create an operational regional response system to pollution
incidents.125 For more than thirty years, information on ship accidents and response
122. Adam Bryant, Mark Toro of North American Properties: ‘Who will Do What by When?,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/mark-toro-of-northamerican-properties-who-will-do-what-by-when.html.
123. The literature on implementation is immense. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN
OAKLAND 163–64 (3d ed. 1984). Since then, the field has grown in many policy areas. See generally Peter
L. Hupe, The Thesis of Incongruent Implementation: Revisiting Pressman and Wildavsky, 26 PUB. POL’Y &
ADMIN. 63 (2011); Keith Smolkowski, Implementation Research, OR. RES. INST., http://homes.ori.org/
~keiths/bibliography/implementation.html [https://perma.cc/SR24-V6TZ] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016).
124. DiMento & Backer, supra note 11.
125. Id.
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capacity itself has been shared with a minimum of delay. Joint procedures are tested
annually in regional HELCOM Balex Delta pollution response exercises at sea.126
Importantly, the cooperation has also fostered a framework of financial rights and
obligations clarifying the terms of provision of international assistance.127 These
activities (obligatory and timely sharing of information, scheduled testing
requirements, and specific financial commitments) are the hallmarks of successful
implementation across sectors and challenges.
To be sure, the Baltic region is one of considerable resources of all kinds, from
financial to technical. But many of these same countries are also Arctic players.
In addition to the lessons offered by the study of the regional seas, we can
learn from the considerable scholarship and policy analysis on international
environmental governance in general. This work underscores the essential role in
implementation of cooperation among nations that share both economic and
environmental protection interests.128 Several decades of analysis suggest that
among the ideas meriting additional consideration are the exchange of information
about best practices across the areas of management responsibility (including, but
not limited to, activities like marine spatial planning and coastal zone management,
and public participation and consultation)129 and review of “on the ground”
attempts at Large Marine Ecosystems and other ecological institutional
management concepts.130 In addition, experiences in other areas of international
environmental law and management recognize the value of policy issue linkages
such as seeing climate change as an opportunity to bring greater visibility to the
Arctic Ocean and region and attract resources associated with concerns over
mitigation and adaptation.131
Although the Arctic already has strong institutions and traditions for scientific
assessments—especially the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP),132 an Arctic Council working group established in 1991—it is important
to further strengthen the science-policy connection. As elsewhere, this can be
accomplished by the publication of new information in formats that managers and
policymakers can easily access and understand as well as by the enhanced sharing
of data through the use of open source tools and standardized processes. So too
efforts to promote information exchange and communication at a national level
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The call for public participation is universal, but it can also be hollow. Within the
framework suggested herein, roles and activities are identified for those parties who have an interest in
Arctic environmental protection. In addition to the departments, agencies, NGOs, and others usually
at the table of program development, effective implementation needs to include indigenous peoples,
whether Permanent Participants or not, whose activities on the land and in the waters of the Arctic
ultimately affect environmental protection.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Welcome to AMAP, AMAP, http://www.amap.no/about [https://perma.cc/9R9GHYV6] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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(e.g. between national focal points) can provide a basis for improving cooperation
among the member states. Existing national entities in many of the Arctic states are,
it seems, generally quite prepared to transfer relevant information.
It is crucial to structure cooperation in ways that make existing law and
initiatives operational and amenable to implementation. One area where this is of
particular importance in the Arctic is in the identification of an effective means of
integrating two kinds of knowledge: that which is traditionally called scientific and
that which is traditional (i.e., from indigenous peoples and from others within the
regional experience).133 Specific approaches include the use of intercultural
knowledge-bridgers (previously referred to as boundary spanners) and assisted
dialogue.134
A. Case Study: Ecosystems-Based Management
Implementation analysis is inherently case specific. Identifying relevant and
implicated actors, management units, social and environmental processes, and
timetables involved in effective implementation of a policy or legal obligation is not
a generic task with a set checklist of activities. Implementation is not guided in the
abstract. Implementation approaches will likely differ across sectors: shipping, oil,
black carbon pollution, fishing and marine mammal management, and acidification.
Nonetheless, looking to and across cases can inform what needs to be done in any
specific sector.
Several cases in the Arctic create implementation challenges. Among these are
black carbon reduction, oil spill preparation and response, and ecosystems-based
management. These differ in their scale, scope, and timing of environmental
effects—and some are more easily addressed than others.135
I have chosen as an example ecosystems-based management. Here, managers
are encouraged to build on ecosystems and other physical and spatial
conceptualizations of the marine and marine-terrestrial environment. It is one of
several socioecological, ecological-institutional, or ecosystems-based management
concepts that have been suggested in national governments, the Arctic Council, and
other international organizations to assist with effective governance of the seas.
On several occasions the United Nations has called for consideration of these
133. For concrete examples of indigenous knowledge relevant to the Arctic, see Shelley Wright,
Inuit Perspectives on Governance in the Canadian Arctic, in POLAR OCEANS GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 189 (Tim Stephens & David L. VanderZwaag eds., 2014).
134. DONALD N. MICHAEL, ON LEARNING TO PLAN–AND PLANNING TO LEARN (1973);
Erin L. Bohensky & Yiheyis Maru, Indigenous Knowledge, Science, and Resilience: What Have We Learned from
a Decade of International Literature on “Integration”?, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Dec. 2011, at 6; Fulvio Mazzocchi,
Western Science and Traditional Knowledge, 7 EMBO REP. 463 (2006).
135. In fact, the Council on Councils characterizes the black carbon reduction challenge as
“relatively easy.” David Runnalls, Next Steps in Arctic Governance, COUNCIL COUNCILS (May 14, 2014),
http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32983
[https://perma.cc/JDY4-P7TR]
(“Black carbon is relatively easy to manage (e.g., through improved cooking stoves in India and China
and better diesel engines and fuel). Controlling these could buy the world some time to address climate
change more broadly.”).
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strategies, recognizing the following:
While there is no single internationally agreed-upon ecosystem approach
or definition of an “ecosystem approach”, the concept is generally
understood to encompass the management of human activities, based on
the best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes, so as
to ensure that ecosystems structure and functions are sustained for the
benefit of present and future generations.136
In 2005, the General Assembly requested that the meeting of the United
Nations’ open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the
Sea focus on the ecosystem approaches and oceans.137 Participants suggested
constitutive elements of an ecosystem approach.138 Later, the General Assembly
invited States to consider these elements and recalled “that States should be guided
in the application of ecosystem approaches by a number of existing instruments.”139
The General Assembly noted in particular the Convention and its implementing
Agreements and encouraged states to cooperate and coordinate their efforts and to
“take . . . all measures, in conformity with international law, . . . to address impacts
on marine ecosystems in areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, taking into
account the integrity of the ecosystems concerned.”140
These approaches have been attempted in limited circumstances in some
regions.141 Integrating knowledge of physical conditions into jurisdictional
considerations and institutional strategies remains a promising approach.
However, implementation of these new tools is challenging here, as elsewhere.
Responsible or potentially responsible institutions have not developed under a
single lawmaking or policy framework. Contributions to physical assessments are
not coordinated in a central way, and scientific understandings of the approaches
to use do not neatly converge. To give one example: Erik J. Molenaar and Alex G.
Oude Elferink note with regard to OSPAR’s designation of Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs) that “the process after the identification of a potential MPA has to be

136
Ecosystem Approaches, Oceans & L. Sea: Div. Ocean Affairs & L. Sea,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/ecosystem_approaches/ecosystem_approaches.htm [https://perma.cc
/W4X7-6VBD] (last updated July 21, 2010).
137. See G.A. Res. 60/30, ¶ 85 (Nov. 29, 2005).
138. Rep. on the Work of the U.N. Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and
the Law of the Sea at its Seventh Meeting, transmitted by Letter Dated 14 July 2006 from the CoChairpersons of the Consultative Process Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, at 2–5,
U.N. Doc. A/61/156 ( July 17, 2006).
139. G.A. Res. 61/222, ¶ 119 (Dec. 20, 2006).
140. Id. (alteration in original). The General Assembly, in G.A. Res. 62/177, at 5–6 (Dec. 18,
2007), encouraged States by 2010 to apply “an ecosystem approach” to sustainable fisheries and either
directly or through regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements (RFMO/As),
“adopting and implementing conservation and management measures addressing, inter alia, by-catch,
pollution, overfishing, and protecting habitats of specific concern, taking into account existing
guidelines of FAO.” The importance of elements of the ecosystems approach was reiterated in G.A.
Res. 62/215, at 18 (Dec. 22, 2007).
141. Ecosystem-Based Management, SEAWEB, http://www.seaweb.org/resources/ebm/
implementingebm.php [https://perma.cc/G7LG-RGYG] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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carried out in consultation with the competent international organizations. That
procedure, which might involve half a dozen or more organizations, might make
the whole process rather cumbersome . . . .”142 They describe some of the required
“contacts with other organizations.” The international alphabet cluster includes the
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), Interntaional Maritime
Organization (IMO), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North Atlantic
Marine Mammals Commission (NAMMCO), the North Atlantic Salmon
Conservation Organization (NASCO), the Authority, and the United Nations
Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).143
The science encompassed in evolving ecosystems-based institutional
approaches is still developing and the complexities of linking physical characteristics
(themselves often changing) with evolving management understandings are being
worked through. As with many attempts to have social organizations and their
members agree upon the value and importance of adopting new or untested
approaches, resistance can be considerable. These changes also have political
significance. The responses of governments and regional organizations to initiatives
that can threaten autonomy, funding, articulated priorities, or control will not always
be made based on acceptance of the conceptual value of the initiative.
The Arctic Council itself has called for the use of what it refers to as EBM
(Ecosystems-Based Management).144 It has made several recommendations with
regard to institutional development. As to the specific nature of the EBM system,
it articulated nine constituent principles:
1. EBM supports ecosystem resilience in order to maintain
ecological functions and services.
2. EBM recognizes that humans and their activities are an integral
part of the ecological system as a whole, and that sustainable use
142. Erik J. Molenaar & Alex G. Oude Elferink, Marine Protected Areas in Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction: The Pioneering Efforts Under the OSPAR Convention, UTRECHT L. REV., June 2009, at 5, 15–16.
143. Id. at 16. On the question of the effectiveness of MPAs, University of Tasmania researchers
studied dozens of marine-protected areas in several countries; they found that almost sixty percent of
the areas were no better off than areas where fishing was allowed. Five essential characteristics were
associated with the most successful areas:
1. Those designated ‘no take’ (allowing no fishing whatsoever),
2. Those where rules were well enforced,
3. Those more than ten years old,
4. Those bigger than 100 square kilometers, and
5. Those isolated by deep water or sand.
Areas with four or five of those attributes “had a far richer variety of species, five times the biomass of large
fish and fourteen times the biomass of sharks, which are indicators of ecological health. Most
underachieving marine sanctuaries had only one or two of these magic factors, and thus ‘were not
ecologically distinguishable from fished sites.’” Editorial, To Save Fish and Birds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014,
at SR10. This type of knowledge, disseminated across regions, can assist in implementing what otherwise
may be a rather vague mandate.
144. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC (2013),
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/122/MM08_EBM_
report%20%281%29.pdf.
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and values are central to establishing management objectives.
EBM is place-based, with geographic areas defined by ecological
criteria, and may require efforts at a range of spatial and temporal
scales (short-, medium- and long-term).
4. EBM balances and integrates the conservation and sustainable use
ecosystems and their components.
5. EBM aims to understand and address the cumulative impacts of
multiple human activities (rather than individual sectors, species
or ecosystem components).
6. EBM seeks to incorporate and reflect, to the extent it is relevant,
expert knowledge including scientific, traditional and local
knowledge.
7. EBM is inclusive and encourages participation at all stages by
various levels of government, indigenous peoples, stakeholders
(including the private sector) and other Arctic residents.
8. Transboundary perspectives and partnerships can contribute
significantly to the success of EBM efforts.
9. Recognizing that ecosystems and human activities are dynamic,
that the Arctic is undergoing rapid changes, and that our
understanding of these systems is constantly evolving, successful
EBM efforts are flexible and adaptive.145
Articulation of ecological criteria, determinations of scales, operational
definitions of what is sustainable, modeling of cumulative impacts, integration of
types of knowledge, monitoring: these numerous constituents of EBM do not have
commonly accepted, consensus meanings. These remain themselves words, not
implementation. They each require assignment of resources including human
resources to individual elements with, ideally, specified markers of implementation,
including deadlines.
EBM and related principles can be implemented through nation-state actions.
The U.S. government has articulated fairly detailed operational activities for a related
goal: the development of integrated ecosystem research in areas of the Arctic.146
Such programs approximate a level of implementation guidance necessary to
convert Arctic policy to Arctic environmental protection. The U.S. plan calls for the
creation of a team to “develop hypotheses about responses to long-term trends,
build scenarios for future subsistence and commercial use of living marine
resources, and undertake process studies to inform models to project future
ecosystem status” through the development of a foundation for new scientific
research activities. This can be achieved through syntheses and assessments of
3.

145. Id. at 13.
146. See THE WHITE HOUSE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
THE ARCTIC REGION 17 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_arctic_region_-_fiFalsepdf [https://
perma.cc/G5EP-BK3E].
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existing data and information and “delineat[ing] and initiat[ing] 3 to 5 year research
and exploration activities, including mechanisms to integrate interagency and
international results . . . .”147 The plan also identifies lead agencies for actions and
for the completion of reporting deadlines.148
B. International Obligation Processing in General
Implementation analysis in general is specific to a topic or treaty obligation.
However, some implementation steps may be relevant across a number of law and
policy areas. Implementation foci need to be prioritized. In the international arena,
it is often not clear by whom the foci should be prioritized; therefore, a common
element of implementation plans is the designation of the lead entity. Once chosen,
that entity, perhaps in some cases a Secretariat such as the Arctic Council, needs to
work to reach a consensus on the agenda for actions.149 This itself is a challenging
task. The entity might need to survey how individual actors (member states, their
agencies, scientific communities, those with jurisdiction, and other defined
stakeholders) understand a requirement that must be implemented.150 The entity
then would assemble these understandings and, through a process such as a Delphi
approach, create a working understanding of what is required.151 Lawrence
147. Id.
148. See id. Another example of this level of detail is the following: “Convene a science
integration conference to demonstrate new and updated cyber-infrastructure tools to enhance data
integration and application, and to identify opportunities for sharing of technology and tools among
interagency partners by the end of 2016.” Id. at 17. The program’s responsible actors are the National
Science Foundation (as the lead agency) as well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (under the aegis of the Department of Commerce), the Department of the Interior, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as supporting agencies).
149. Betsy Baker and Brooks Yeager have recommended an Arctic Ocean Coordinating
Agreement (AOCA) that may have a somewhat similar function. Betsy Baker & Brooks Yeager,
Coordinated Ocean Stewardship in the Arctic: Needs, Challenges and Possible Models for an Arctic Ocean Coordinating
Agreement, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 359, 360 (2015). For them, the primary purpose is “to improve and
regularize coordination of national conservation and management policies in the Arctic.” Id. (describing
the entity as bringing together experts from national governments and international institutions that
analyze targeted questions relevant to the Arctic Ocean).
150. Because the quality of implementation is related to the allocation of specific responsibilities
among cooperating entities, the Chair of the Arctic Council initially needs to establish very specific
priorities. It is true that, ideally, the effective governance of the Arctic requires addressing a range of
challenges. It is also true that the Chair needs to be specific about the most important goals, such as
addressing black carbon or establishing additional marine reserves. Moreover, the Chair can exert
pressure on members to undertake very specific tasks, the implementation of which will be closely
followed.
151. The Delphi technique developed at RAND gathers data from respondents within their
domain of expertise. It is designed “as a group communication process which aims to achieve a
convergence of opinion on a specific real-world issue. The Delphi process has been used in various
fields of study such as . . . resource utilization to develop a full range of alternatives, explore or expose
underlying assumptions, as well as correlate judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines.”
Chia-Chien Hsu & Brian A. Sandford, The Delphi Technique: Making Sense of Consensus, 12 PRAC.
ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION, Aug. 2007, at 1, 1. See generally Noam Levin et al., Incorporating
Socioeconomic and Political Drivers of International Collaboration into Marine Conservation Planning,
63 BIOSCIENCE 547 (2013) (a conservation prioritization).
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Susskind’s work on stakeholder assessment of fishing priorities in the Arctic
through the Harvard Program on Negotiation in 2014 (the Harvard study) offers a
promising model.152 That understanding is then brought back to the policy or
lawmaking body that has a required schedule for adopting the understanding or a
modified version thereof. The organizing entity (for example, the Arctic Council
Secretariat) then would create a schedule, identify lead agencies (sometimes referred
to as management units)153 for meeting requirements according to the schedule,
require a response within a certain time, and monitor and report to the policy body,
or its executive or subsidiary committee responsible for implementation, on
progress toward goals.154 These are processes used in some efficiently managed
complex organizations that could be applied to complex multinational law
activities.155
D. Scott Slocombe has identified several needs for application and exploration
in specific cases: data collection including monitoring on past and present system
functioning; exploration of methods to organize, display, and illustrate the
relationships of data collected; and synthesis of the data.156
1.

Several Other Steps and Activities Are Common to Successful Implementation:
a.

Monitoring

Monitoring is a sine qua non across most implementing activities. The Harvard
study included in its “Gaps in Scientific Knowledge” criterion the need to “develop
capacity to monitor ocean conditions [in the Arctic]” and the need to “standardize
and improve monitoring domestically and internationally” as well as “coordinate
monitoring efforts.”157 Specifically addressing ecosystem-based management,
Martin Z. P. Olszynski “situates monitoring in its proper context as a prerequisite
to the successful implementation of ecosystem management (‘EM’), an emerging if
still not fully understood environmental policy model, the effective implementation
152. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENT FOR DEVISING SEMINAR ON ARCTIC FISHERIES (2014),
https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/AFDS_StakeholderAssessment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LRD9-73WY]; see also Courtney Fidler & Bram F. Noble, Stakeholder Perceptions
of Current Planning, Assessment and Science Initiatives in Canada’s Beaufort Sea, 66 ARCTIC 179
(2013) (identifying the need for a more coordinated approach to planning and decision making for
marine resources).
153. D. Scott Slocombe, Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management, 43 BIOSCIENCE 612,
618 (1993).
154. Because the Arctic Council is not a management agency, some have called for this type of
lead activity to be housed in a separate entity. See Betsy Baker & Brooks Yeager, Coordinated Ocean
Stewardship in the Arctic: Needs, Challenges and Possible Models for an Arctic Ocean Coordinating
Agreement, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 359, 360 (2015) (“The AOCS would convene different groupings
of representatives from national governments and international institutions to bring their expertise to
bear on targeted questions relevant to the Arctic Ocean.”).
155. See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE:
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S BEST RUN COMPANIES (2006).
156. Slocombe, supra note 153, at 620.
157. SUSSKIND, supra note 152, at 11, 16.
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of which presents its own set of challenges.”158 Monitoring can be done using both
science-based sites and through local people.159
b.

Improve and Expand Communication Policy

Communication with other institutions, public and private, can be mandated
according to specific schedules. “Steps could include better coordination between
member states in individual forums that are part of the global law of the sea regime
such as the IMO, and by entering into targeted MOUs with certain of its current
observers.”160
c.

Strengthen Subregional Mechanisms

As Suzanne Lalonde notes, “[o]ne such important institution is the forum for
intergovernmental and interregional cooperation in the Barents Region, the Barents
Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which covers the northern parts of Finland, Norway
and Sweden as well as the North-West regions of Russia.”161
d.

Coordinate Legal Regimes

Connection to the OSPAR network in the North-East Atlantic would likely
be helpful, for example, for its ecologically representative regional system of MPAs.
This regime goes beyond the pollution-prevention goal of both the Oslo and Paris
conventions.162 Lalonde explains that “the Bremen Ministerial Statement . . .
committed the Commission members to the establishment . . . of a joint network
of well-managed and ecologically coherent marine protected areas.”163
e.

Identify What Is Lacking in Existing Regimes

Among the “main gaps in the existing regime of international fisheries fora
and instruments related to the Arctic Ocean” is a lack of data without which

158. Martin Z.P. Olszynski, Environmental Monitoring and Ecosystem Management in the Oil Sands:
Spaceship Earth or Escort Tugboat?, 10 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2014).
159. Finn Danielsen et al., Linking Public Participation in Scientific Research to the Indicators and Needs
of International Environmental Agreements, CONSERVATION LETTERS, Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 12, 12.
160. Betsy Baker, The Developing Regional Regime for the Marine Arctic, in THE LAW OF THE SEA
AND THE POLAR REGIONS: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGIMES 35, 58
(Erik J. Molenaar et al. eds., 2013) (referring to the marine aspects).
161. Suzanne Lalonde, Marine Protected Areas in the Arctic, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE
POLAR REGIONS, supra note 160, at 85, 104.
162. See id. at 105. In her conclusion, Lalonde cites the work of Chircop et al.: “An essential
aspect of MPA making . . . is the governance framework . . . . Where MPA cooperation has an
international dimension . . . the governance framework needs to include a . . . coordinated legal
arrangement.” Id. at 109 (quoting Chircop et al.) (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 106. Many MPAs were established, although Sweden’s contribution was modest. Id.
at 106–07. Norway nominated “three extensive sites around the Svalbard archipelago.” Id. at 107.
OSPAR’s greatest success story concerns the establishment of MPAs in Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction [ABNJ]: “Approximately 40% of the OSPAR Maritime Area is beyond the jurisdiction of
coastal states and there are three high seas areas within the CAFF Arctic Conservation Boundary.” Id.
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“[s]cience-based and ecosystem-based fisheries management” cannot be ensured.164
Outside third parties or management consultants, among others, could undertake
systematic evaluation of weak or nonexistent elements of regimes. This information
then would be reported back, for example to the Arctic Council, on a regular
(defined) schedule.
f.

Implement Through Ongoing Successful Programs and Regime Types

Existing funds and agencies on national or regional levels have some programs
relevant to Arctic concerns. Utilizing them for goals of international environmental
law poses no insurmountable regional obstacles. After all, despite the existence and
demands of international treaties and institutions, the nation state remains sovereign
over many activities that will be implicated by adopting international goals.165 It
makes little sense, for example, for Alaskan indigenous peoples to wait for
international climate change funds to be established to mitigate Arctic
environmental damage before seeking compensation from the national government
in which they reside. In fact, it may turn out to be the case that transferring domestic
planning and programming techniques to the international sphere becomes a major
element of implementation of some international obligations.
There is a special subquestion on the larger inquiry about the need for
additional law. Additional law replicating successful private agreements may provide
a means for implementation not always available in international public law. Check
argues, for example, for bilateral investment treaties among the Arctic states:
If the coastal states were to enter into a bilateral investment treaty
specifically for the benefit of the oil and gas industry, the diplomatic
negotiations over such a treaty may accomplish what an [Antarctic Treaty
System]–style structure, the CLCS, or any one of the formalists’ legal
‘solutions’ never could: provide the Arctic with a stable legal regime.
Because bilateral investment treaties often include dispute resolution,
security, investment protections, and a host of other facilitating
mechanisms, many of the Arctic’s chilling effects on energy development
may be avoided.166
In these “private international law” fora, incentives to implement agreements
and obligations already exist in the relevant market.167 The Arctic Council has
commenced action that can facilitate implementation in direct links to private sector
activities.168 Industry can assist in many ways, for example through the
harmonization of terms and supplementary third-party verification of required
164. Erik J. Molenaar, Arctic Fisheries Management, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE POLAR
REGIONS, supra note 160, at 243, 260.
165. See, e.g., Peter Gullestad et al., Changing Attitudes 1970–2012: Evolution of the Norwegian
Management Framework to Prevent Overfishing and to Secure Long-Term Sustainability, 71 ICES J.
MARINE SCI. 173 (2014).
166. Check, supra note 67.
167. See id.
168. Koivurova, supra note 31, at 16–17.
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reports in the monitoring process.169 Promoting corporate social responsibility
standards of companies operating in the Arctic is a general means of linking private
goals to public goods.170
Successful examples in other regions include the use of specific ad hoc
mechanisms. In their case study of the Crown of the Continent, Jack Tuholske and
Mark Foster demonstrated “how subnational actors negotiated a nonbinding
agreement with reciprocal responsibilities that would protect the North Fork and
lead to more sustainable, transboundary governance of the entire Crown.”171 The
factors that led to a successful resolution of this dispute were implemented on both
sides of the border and included recognition of the role of international law and
norms, the involvement of subnational political actors, and “the development of a
nonbinding Memorandum of Agreement.”172 Tuholske and Foster concluded that
the Memorandum “represents a huge step in transboundary environmental
cooperation . . . crafted locally to solve a single dispute, has led to significant onthe-ground protection on both sides of the international border that extend far
beyond just resolving the dispute over coal mining in a single river drainage.”173
Memoranda of understanding or agreement are vehicles that can force parties to
address environmental problems at an operational level.
Other such detailed customized agreements have been employed in the Arctic
itself. Subsistence participants and industry participants have entered into
agreements, for example with regard to whaling.174

169. Gregory L. Rose, Gaps in the Implementation of Environmental Law at the National,
Regional and Global Level, UNEP REPORT (First Preparatory Meeting of the World Congress on
Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental Sustainability), Oct. 12–13, 2011, at 15.
170. See, e.g., Tafsir Johansson & Patrick Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance
and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift: In Search of a Pragmatic Balance for the
Arctic 75–91 (2015).
171. Jack Tuholske & Mark Foster, Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: Success in the
Crown of the Continent, 92 Or. L. Rev. 649, 653 (2014).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 721.
174. See, e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Fisheries, 2012 Open
Water Season Programmatic Conflict Avoidance Agreement (2012), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
pr/pdfs/permits/bp_openwater_caa2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRB8-WJWM] (agreement between
oil companies and whaling associations); The AEWC, North Slope Borough, http://www.northslope.org/departments/wildlife-management/other-topics/iwc-and-aewc/aewc [https://perma.cc/
B4U6-G5AF] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (“Conflict Avoidance Agreement. . . . This agreement
implements mitigation measures that allow industry to conduct their work while maintaining the
availability of marine mammals for subsistence hunters. One important aspect of the CAA are time and
area closures.”); see also, e.g., North Slope Borough, North Shore Borough Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas
Development Policy Positions (n.d.), http://www.north-slope.org/assets/images/uploads/8%
20points%20NSB%20OCS%20policies%20FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L53-7Y4R]; Jessica S.
Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design of Process and Law Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43
Envtl. L. Rep. 10893 (2013). Lefevre ties the activity directly to ecosystem-based management, noting
that the “very general, even theoretical” approach benefits from the “real-world application” of many
of the approaches and related innovations. Lefevre, supra, at 10902.
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CONCLUSION
The environmental law that makes up the governance framework for the
Arctic region is plentiful. It is also at times and in places overlapping, occasionally
contradictory, or at least conflicting, and almost always challenging for
implementation across nations. Perhaps some additional treaties—regional, global,
and bilateral—are needed to improve the environmental quality of this region of
the century. I argue here that, whatever is decided on the desirability of new law,
new initiatives should be consistent with—and not counter to—obligations that the
Arctic nations, and the international community, already face. Considerable
resources of all kinds are already necessary to make operational existing
requirements; before adding more obligations, policymakers should take heed of
the possible resource limitations—economic, technical, and human—that may be
obstacles to effective law. Implementation work, seldom exciting but often
gratifying, should be a major focus of international efforts. Some of it is ongoing
and with some success. There exists a trove of knowledge and experience that can
expedite meeting on-the-ground and in-the-sea requirements for a cleaner Arctic.
The work needed is time consuming, labor intensive, and highly technical; it
involves, on the one hand, use of state-of-the-art information technologies and, on
the other, recognition of social processes that enhances the probability of actual
communication, consensus formation, and commitment to action. Implementation
is a sine qua non for effective protection of the Arctic.

